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Introduction:	Risking	Feeling:	Alice	Munro’s	Fiction	of	“Exquisite	Shame”	
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We	can	pinpoint	the	origins	of	this	collection	with	unusual	precision.	In	2003,	in	an	essay	
entitled	“The	Baby	or	the	Violin?	Ethics	and	Femininity	in	the	Fiction	of	Alice	Munro,”	Naomi	
Morgenstern	observed	that	“Munro’s	stories	have	much	to	contribute	to	contemporary	efforts	
to	think	about	literariness	and	ethics.”
1
	Indeed,	though	previous	critics	of	Munro	had	by	no	
means	ignored	the	ethical--or	the	affective—dimensions	of	her	work	(Redekop,	Howells,	
Heble),	the	steadfast	focus	on	these	dimensions	afforded	by	the	affective	and	ethical	“turns”	in	
literary	studies	during	and	since	the	time	of	Morgenstern’s	comment	has	allowed,	and	indeed	
called	out,	for	a	dedicated	analysis	of	Alice	Munro’s	stories	from	the	intertwined	perspectives	
of	ethics	and	affects.	Indeed,	in	that	same	2003	essay,	Morgenstern’s	perception	that	“Munro’s	
stories	represent	the	risks	of	the	ethical”
2
	made	it	clear	that	the	affective	dimension—risk	and	
its	associated	feeling	of	vulnerability—is	fully	engaged	in	any	discussion	of	the	ethical.	The	two	
can	hardly	be	disarticulated	for,	as	Brian	Massumi	pronounces,	“Ethics	are	about	how	we	
inhabit	uncertainty	together.”
3
		
The	title	of	this	introduction	is	inspired	by	the	story	“What	Is	Remembered”	(2001),	one	
of	many	Munro	stories	suffused	with	duplicitous,	conflicting,	often	mysterious	affects,	most	
prominently,	a	seductive,	but	unbearable,	erotic,	yet	despicable,	“exquisite	shame.”
4
	The	story	
is	a	compelling	entry	point	for	an	investigation	of	affects	and	ethics	via	shame	since	the	word	
itself	occurs	no	less	than	five	times	in	the	twenty-four-page	story.	Indeed,	shame	is	in	many	
ways	central	to	the	story’s	exploration	of	marriage,	motherhood	and	infidelity	as	experiences	of	
embodiment	intricately	bound	to	affect,	aging,	and	mortality.	The	story	concerns	Meriel,	a	
young	wife	and	mother	chafing	at	the	strictures	of	heteronormative	family	life:	“Young	
husbands	were	stern,	in	those	days.	.	.	.	Off	to	work	every	morning,	clean-shaven,	youthful	
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necks	in	knotted	ties,	days	spent	in	unknown	labors,	home	again	at	suppertime	to	take	a	critical	
glance	at	the	evening	meal	and	to	shake	out	the	newspaper,	hold	it	up	between	themselves	
and	the	muddle	of	the	kitchen,	the	ailments	and	emotions,	the	babies.”
5
	This	vision	of	
“ailments	and	emotions”	as	the	unseemly,	contagious	burden	of	cohabitation	and	home	that	
masculine	power	erects	bulwarks	against	is	central	to	our	collection,	which	considers	how	
illness,	disability,	and	affective	embodiment	destabilize	the	illusion	of	the	able-bodied,	
masculine,	rational,	unaffected	subject	that	underlies	neoliberal	political	discourse.	Meanwhile,	
in	Munro,	the	wives	of	these	young	husbands,	thrust	into	the	“stunning	responsibility”	of	
wifedom	and	motherhood	succumb	to,	balk	at,	and	shirk,	sometimes	simultaneously,	the	
oppressive	demands	of	femininity,	indulging	in	“dreamy	rebellion,	subversive	get-togethers,	
laughing	fits”	that	threaten	to	transgress	the	“newspaper”	barriers	that	their	husbands	have	
erected.
6
	Shared,	“subversive”	ribaldry	is	just	one	of	the	many	radical,	even	dangerous	affects	
that	permeate	Munro’s	fiction.	In	Munro,	affects	expose	and	destabilize,	threaten	and	
transgress	prevailing	gender	and	sexual	politics,	ethical	responsibilities,	and	affective	
economies.	Munro’s	characters	grapple	with	the	risk	of	emotionality,	the	undertow	of	affect	
that	can,	at	its	most	extreme,	produce	selfish	and	cruel	indulgences	of	desire	and	“ugly	
feelings”:	disgust,	shame,	repulsion.	At	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	is	the	exercise	of	self-
effacing	“prudence”	that	maintains	affective	economies,	as	Meriel	does,	despite	her	fleeting	
indulgence	of	extramarital	desire.	In	the	end,	she	pursues	“some	economical	sort	of	emotional	
management”	that	carefully	balances	risks	and	rewards,	forgoing	the	radical	happiness	that	
suffused	her,	momentarily,	in	her	brief	affair.
7
	The	problem	of	affectivity	recurs	throughout	
Munro’s	oeuvre,	which	pays	close	attention	to	the	economy	of	emotions.	As	the	character	
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Joyce	muses	in	the	more	recent	story	“Fiction”	(2009):	“It	almost	seemed	as	if	there	must	be	
some	random	and	of	course	unfair	thrift	in	the	emotional	housekeeping	of	the	world,	if	the	
great	happiness	--	however	temporary,	however	flimsy	--	of	one	person	could	come	out	of	the	
great	unhappiness	of	another.”
8
	Affects	are	never	solitary,	never	without	consequence,	never	
apolitical.	They	are	always	shifting,	transmitting,	transforming,	at	once	exposing	and	creating	
dense,	unpredictable,	invisible	but	palpable	networks	between	bodies.	Affects	are,	in	effect,	
always	affecting,	at	once	noun	and	verb,	being	and	doing	simultaneously.	
	 In	“What	is	Remembered,”	Meriel’s	brief	evasion	of	the	“stunning	responsibility”	of	
wifedom	manifests	in	an	unexpected,	thrilling	sexual	infidelity	with	a	stranger	she	meets	at	a	
funeral.	Guilt
9
	and	shame	are	the	dominant	affects	associated	with	the	“power	and	delight”
10
	of	
the	escapade.	The	association	between	eroticism	and	shame	is	not	unusual,	but	Munro	
complicates	the	straightforward	shameful	thrill,	and	thrilling	shame,	of	illicit	sexual	adventure	
with	intimations	of	aging,	disability,	and	death.	The	opportunity	for	infidelity	is	afforded	by	
Meriel’s	plan	to	visit	her	elderly	namesake,	Aunt	Muriel,	in	a	nursing	home	on	her	way	home	
from	the	funeral.	The	stranger,	an	unnamed	bush	pilot	and	doctor	who	treated	the	deceased,	
offers	to	drive	her	there.	Despite	her	cataracts,	Aunt	Muriel	easily	recognizes	the	frisson	
between	the	pair,	responding	to	the	invisible	“transmission	of	affect”	described	by	Teresa	
Brennan.
11
	“I	could	tell,”	Aunt	Muriel	tells	the	pair,	“I	used	to	be	a	devil	myself.”
12
	The	
magnificent	tension	between	the	narration’s	first	description	of	Aunt	Muriel’s	pointedly	ailing	
body	–	“swollen	and	glimmering”	under	her	asbestos	blanket,	smoking	a	cigarette	alone	in	a	
“dim	corridor”	painted	a	“liverish”	colour;	her	skin	covered	in	“dead-white	spots,”	her	hair	
“ragged,	mussed	from	being	rubbed	into	pillows,	and	the	lobes	of	her	ears	hung	out	of	it	like	
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flat	teats”
13
	–	and	the	licentious	stories	she	tells	of	sexual	adventure,	the	wild	parties	where	
people	would	“Just	meet	for	the	first	time	and	start	kissing	like	mad	and	run	off	into	the	forest.	
In	the	dark,”
14
	reanimates	the	story’s	initial	reference	to	the	feminized	space	of	the	home,	here	
transformed	into	the	nursing	home,	as	an	unseemly	space	dominated	by	“ailments	and	
emotion.”	The	concurrence	of	morbidity	and	“decline”
15
	with	sexual	vitality	and	adventure	
asserts	the	persistence	of	affective	embodiment,	the	often	troubling	unpredictability	of	human	
embodiment	as	a	site	of	combined	vulnerability,	power,	and	risk.	The	masculine	order	that	
seeks	to	disavow	this	precarity,	to	confine	“ailments	and	emotions”	to	the	feminine	space	of	
the	home,	is	a	futile	rejection,	a	false	imposition	of	order	that	cannot	be	sustained:	Meriel’s	
husband,	Pierre,	like	all	the	story’s	men,	succumbs	to	illness	in	the	end,	though	he	strives	to	
maintain	masculine	order	throughout	his	illness.	When	Meriel	reads	Fathers	and	Sons	to	him	
during	his	convalescence,	the	couple	argue	over	the	novel’s	depiction	of	gender	and	romance.	
According	to	Pierre,	Anna	cannot	respond	to	Bazarov’s	declaration	of	love	because	of	the	risk	of	
“shame	and	rejection.	She’s	intelligent.	She	knows	that,”	argues	Pierre.	“Intelligence	makes	her	
cold.	Intelligent	means	cold,	for	a	woman.”
16
	Though	he	clarifies	that	he	is	speaking	of	
nineteenth	century	tropes,	his	reading	echoes	the	earlier	description	of	male	breadwinners	
seeking	to	protect	their	rational	world	(with	newspapers,	no	less)	from	the	disarrayed	
emotionality	and	embodiment	of	the	feminized	space	of	home,	a	re-articulation	of	the	notion	
that	rationality	and	embodied	affects	cannot	cohabitate.	The	either/or	fallacy	of	reason	versus	
emotion	cannot	be	consigned	to	the	past,	as	Meriel’s	story	of	passion	and	prudence	makes	
clear.	
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This	persistent	fiction	–	that	emotions,	embodied	vulnerability	can,	indeed	should,	be	
controlled	and	contained,	limited	to	appropriate	sectors	and	zones	of	life	--	haunts	Munro’s	
characters,	who	can	only	experience	emotions	as	dissonance,	as	the	disorienting	conflict	of	
“exquisite	shame,”	or	“morbid,	preening	excitement.”
17
	This	dissonance	and	its	oxymoronic	
stylistic	vehicle	are	characteristic	of	affect	as	theorized	by	Silvan	Tomkins;	shame,	he	observed,	
is	not	walled	off	from	affects	thought	to	be	positive,	such	as	interest/excitement	or	
enjoyment/joy;	indeed,	it	is,	in	his	words,	“produced	by	the	incomplete	reduction	of	the	
positive	affects	of	interest	and	enjoyment.”
18
	Recalling	the	brief	affair	with	the	doctor	years,	
even	decades	later,	Meriel	experiences	“the	raw	surprise	of	her	own	body,	the	racketing	of	
desire.”
19
	The	story’s	only	mention	of	entirely	positive	affects	--	her	body	“packed	full	of	
happiness,	rewarded	as	she	would	surely	never	be	again,	every	cell	in	her	body,	plumped	up	
with	a	sweet	self-esteem”
20
	--	is	delivered	as	the	(potential)	rationale	for	suicide.	A	barely	
entertained	idea	she	takes	from	romantic	fiction,	“a	certain	kind	of	story—not	the	kind	that	
anybody	wrote	anymore.”
21
	All-consuming	pleasure,	the	kind	that	affects	every	cell	in	the	body,	
is	such	a	rarity	that	it	becomes	a	kind	of	inverse	trauma,	a	haunting	recollection	that	takes	her	
body	by	storm	again	and	again	in	the	decades	that	follow.		
“What	Is	Remembered”	draws	our	attention	to	the	inextricable	entanglement	of	
gender,	bodies,	affects	and	ethics	in	Munro’s	work.	Margaret	Atwood	has	described	Munro	as	
the	preeminent	writer	of	shame:	“I	can	think	of	no	other	writer	who	returns	to	the	emotion	of	
shame	so	frequently	and	meticulously	as	Munro.”
22
	However,	as	our	contributors	demonstrate,	
shame	is	only	the	beginning.	Munro’s	stories	explore	the	wide	range	of	shifting,	contradictory	
embodied	affects,	at	once	perceived	and	mysterious,	felt	and	disavowed.	The	discussion	of	
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affects	is,	we	suggest,	always	inevitably	a	discussion	of	ethics	since	the	way	bodies	register	and	
create	affects,	and	how	those	affects	initiate,	or	often	fail	to	initiate	action	in	the	world	creates	
a	tangle	of	causes	and	effects.	Munro’s	stories	explore	the	connections	between	negative	
affects	–	shame,	disgust,	guilt	–	and	negative,	cruel,	even	homicidal	actions	in	often	
discomforting	detail.	The	dismissal	of	emotions	and	emotionality	as	frivolous,	“feminine,”	
without	consequence,	as	somehow	removed	from	the	masculine	domains	of	politics	and	work	
is	a	ridiculous,	yet	dangerously	persistent	conviction.	As	these	explorations	of	Munro’s	fiction	
make	clear,	emotions	are	powerful,	productive,	and	always	political.		
***	
	 The	following	essays	explore	how	the	denizens	and	readers	of	Alice	Munro’s	fictional	
worlds	“inhabit	uncertainty	together”	as	they	come	up	against	the	manifold	challenges	of	living	
in	the	world.	As	Claire	Omhovere	reminds	us,	the	term	‘ethos’	first	meant	“dwelling	place.”	
Being	in	the	world	becomes,	in	Munro’s	fiction,	a	matter	of	considering	the	degree	of	
habitability	the	world	affords	us	and	how	“open”	to	that	world	we	can	be.	As	several	of	our	
contributors	note,	in	the	case	of	characters	who	find	themselves	on	the	lower	rungs	of	social	
hierarchies	of	gender,	class,	age,	or	(less	often)	race,	the	degree	of	choice	about	how	open	they	
can	be	to	the	world	and	its	harshness	or	pleasures	is	seriously	compromised.	Some	of	that	
harshness	comes	from	the	confrontations	of	ethics	with	morality,	and	its	associated	values	of	
resoluteness	and	certitude.	The	following	essays	ponder	the	collision	of	ethics	as	“dwelling”—as	
a	place	one	can	or	cannot	“inhabit”—and	the	“uncertainty”	that	attaches	itself	to	our	
(differently)	embodied	experiences	of	the	world.		
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	 Embodiment	is,	for	several	of	these	critics,	a	dwelling	too,	and	a	conduit	by	which	the	
particularities	of	the	everyday	resist	the	grander	narratives	of	morality	and	Enlightenment	
individualism.	In	these	essays,	the	authors	explore	the	consequences	of	unruly	embodiment	
that	interfere	with	gendered	identity	and	humanist	conventions	of	the	human	based	on	reason	
and	rationality.	For	Sara	Jamieson,	the	embodied	dailiness	of	breastfeeding	offers	one	site	at	
which	Munro’s	women	can	depart	(or	not)	from	a	timeless,	transcendent-seeming	moral	realm	
of	“good	mothering.”	For	Marlene	Goldman,	that	most	Munrovian	affect	of	them	all—shame—
brings	subjects	back	to	their	inescapable,	vulnerable	corporeality.	Writing	out	of	her	own	
embodied	experience	of	chronic	pain,	Amelia	DeFalco	shows	how	those	affects	that	are	visibly	
embodied	in	Munro’s	characters	are	precisely	those	that	are	socially	denigrated,	for	they	
transgress	cultural	privilegings	of	autonomy	and	individualism.	Several	contributors	examine	
Munro’s	use	of	animal	metaphors	as	a	means	of	signaling	this	denigration;	Heidi	Tiedemann	
Darroch,	for	example,	notes	the	way	in	which	the	possession	of	“reason”	is	often	cited	as	
evidence	in	favour	of	animal	rights:	an	argument	that	has	the	effect	of	disenfranchising	
cognitively	impaired	people	as	full	subjects.	As	she	points	out,	philosophical	discussions	of	
cognitive	impairment	as	test	cases	for	viable	or	worthwhile	lives	have	the	same	effect.	Munro’s	
characters	whose	embodied	affects	place	them	beneath	consideration	have	a	richly	troubling	
philosophical	context.	
	 In	similar	fashion,	many	of	these	readings	of	Munro’s	stories	probe	the	psychic	
dynamics	by	which	such	denigrations	operate.	As	Darroch	argues,	those	Munro	characters	who	
recoil	from	disabled	people	may	be	operating	out	of	envy	for	those	who	may	lack	self-
consciousness	about	their	refusals	or	failures	to	follow	social	scripts.	To	be	“shameless”	is	
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subject,	in	Munro’s	fictional	world,	to	a	complicated	mixture	of	desire	and	repulsion.	In	
analyzing	the	extreme	case	of	the	urge	toward	repulsion—murder—Susan	Warwick	sees	it	as	
the	ultimate	test	case	for	the	ethical	choice	between	“repudiation	and	responsibility”	that	is	
endemic	to	the	encounter	with	the	“other.”	Amelia	DeFalco	sees	the	origins	of	that	choice	in	
our	very	openness	to	the	world,	for	it	entails	risk	(the	risking	of	affect);	the	desire	to	limit	that	
risk	that	many	of	Munro’s	characters	feel	is,	in	effect,	a	refusal	of	ethical	encounter.	Like	the	
phrase,	“exquisite	shame,”	her	description	of	this	“affective	dissonance	and	ethical	unease”	
syntactically	balances	and	intertwines	the	affective	and	the	ethical.	
	 Human	encounters	often	form	the	tacitly	assumed	ground	zero	of	ethical	criticism,	and	
yet	both	the	burgeoning	field	of	animal	studies	and	the	wider	examination	of	the	more-than-
human	world	offer	salient	correctives	to	that	tendency.	In	Claire	Omhovere’s	essay	in	this	
volume,	for	instance,	landscape	is	not	the	usual	reflective	metaphor	for	human	ethical	
encounter	but	it	becomes,	instead,	the	very	locus	of	ethical	and	affective	negotiation.	
Landscape,	in	the	form	of	those	frequent	references	to	geological	change	and	the	recurring	
figure	of	waste	in	Munro’s	stories,	is	a	site	for	a	phenomenological	being-in-the-world:	a	
mutually	constitutive	relationship	between	a	vulnerable	environment	and	its	vulnerable	human	
inhabitants.	
	 Omhovere’s	phenomenological	language	finds	resonance	in	other	essays	in	this	
collection	that	take	phenomenology	in	a	more	feminist,	performative	direction.	Judith	Butler	
opened	her	pioneering	essay	“Performative	Acts	and	Gender	Constitution”	by	thinking	about	
feminist	reimaginings	of	phenomenology,	specifically	de	Beauvoir’s	revisions	of	Merleau-Ponty.	
Butler’s	understanding	of	the	way	identity	is	forged	in	repeated	mundane	acts	depends	upon	a	
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sense	of	embodiment	that	grows	out	of	Merleau-Ponty’s	concept	of	the	body	as	an	historical	
idea	rather	than	a	transhistorical	essence.	So	too,	in	these	readings	of	Munro’s	embodied	
affects	and	their	ethical	implications,	several	of	these	critics	emphasize	the	repeated,	
performative	nature	of	ethics.	In	her	earlier	essay,	Naomi	Morgenstern	asks	why,	in	Munro,	the	
central	ethical	insight—i.e.,	the	existence	of	the	other	beyond	the	self—needs	to	be	repeatedly	
rehearsed.	In	the	essays	that	follow,	critics	have	much	to	say	about	this	iterative,	performative	
nature	of	ethical	behavior.	Katherine	Sutherland	argues	that	Munro’s	retrospective	narratives	
of	childhood	often	detail	the	breakdown	of	affective	relations	between	children	and	adults	that	
are	in	a	state	of	constant	becoming.	So,	too,	Goldman,	examining	“the	performative	nature	of	
shame”	stresses	iterative	mimicry;	shame,	she	concludes,	is	the	consequence	of	an	inability	or	
unwillingness	“to	mimic	the	norm.”	In	a	similar	vein,	Lorraine	York	explores	Munro’s	own	
performance	of	public	affects,	and	how	her	performance	of	reluctance	has	been	subsumed	
within	a	larger	national	mythology	of	Canadian	humility.	Despite	this	normalization	and	
apparent	acquiescence,	Munro’s	reluctance	manages	to	maintain	its	roots	in	ambivalence	and	
unease	as	a	way	of	“tarrying	with”	difficult,	negative,	often	ugly	emotions.!
	 Affective	performativity	in	(and	by)	Munro,	like	performativity	in	general	for	Butler,	
opens	up	the	possibility	of	departure	from	social	scripts,	even	though	there	remain	social	
punishments	for	not	performing	according	to	those	scripts.	Accordingly,	a	number	of	the	
contributors	to	this	volume	approach	the	question	of	hope	amidst	sometimes	painful,	difficult,	
affective	and	ethical	exchanges:	is	there	a	possibility	for	subversion	of	the	hierarchies	that	are	
tied	to	embodied	affects,	to	those	shamefully	visible	performances	of	affect	in	Alice	Munro’s	
stories	that	lead	to	betrayal,	inhibition,	self-denial,	“royal	beatings,”	and	even	murder?	
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Goldman	identifies	“socially	transformative	performative	utterances…alternative,	gestural	
forms	of	communication	and	mimesis”:	in	a	word,	play.	Ana	Fraile	Marcos	sees	shame	as	
potentially	enabling	the	workings	of	what	Winfried	Siemerling	calls	re/cognition:	moving	
beyond	the	capacity	to	see	the	other	in	the	self,	and	the	self	in	the	other,	which	arguably	
involves	assimilating	the	unknown	to	the	known,	and,	instead,	accomplishing	the	more	
refractory,	difficult	work	of	cognitive	and	ethical	change.	Such	a	possibility	is	active	in	Silvan	
Tomkins’s	theorizing	of	shame	as	intimately	intertwined	in	“a	relationship	of	mutuality,”	for	the	
shame	that	Tomkins	associates	with	the	physical	act	of	averting	one’s	face	and	gaze	from	the	
source	of	humiliation	or	judgment	bears	“the	residual	positive	wish…not	only	to	look	at	the	
other	rather	than	to	look	down,	but	to	have	the	other	look	[back]	with	interest	or	enjoyment	
rather	than	derision.”
23
	Warwick,	considering	the	ultimate	breakdown	of	ethical	exchange	or	
“gaze”—murder—perceives	hope	even	there:	the	response	of	shame	at	such	a	failure	can	bring	
with	it	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	responsibility	we	bear	for	each	other.		
	 Closing	out	our	collection,	Naomi	Morgenstern’s	new	essay	offers	radical	and	nuanced	
grounds	for	hope.	Morgenstern	proposes	that	the	posthumous	existence	of	Munro’s	women	
characters	who	live	on,	endure,	survive,	says	something	profound	about	Alice	Munro’s	ethical	
world.	Living	on	in	the	aftermath	of	death,	abandonment,	pain,	she	suggests,	is	a	deeply	
“relational”	act.	Like	Omhovere’s	musings	on	“wasted”	landscape	as	a	refusal	of	the	economies	
of	utilitarianism,	Morgenstern’s	life-left-over	challenges	the	teleology	of	the	life	narrative	as	
ending	in	death	and	presents	us	with	a	moving	sense	of	life	itself	as	posthumous.	In	seeing	
Munro	as	the	chronicler	of	women’s	affective	lives-after-life	that	take	shape	in	narratives	that	
are	always	attentive	to	the	might-have-been	alternative	narratives,	Morgenstern	implicitly	
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places	her	in	a	tradition	of	women’s	writing	that	has	deeply	examined	the	ethics	and	affects	of	
lives	that	exceed	conventional	narrative	containers.	As	Jane	Austen’s	Anne	Eliot	declares	in	her	
(fittingly)	posthumous	novel	Persuasion,	“All	the	privilege	I	claim	for	my	own	sex	(it	is	not	a	very	
enviable	one,	you	need	not	covet	it)	is	that	of	loving	longest,	when	existence	or	when	hope	is	
gone.”
24
	
	 In	our	own	nod	to	the	recursive	performances	of	ethics	and	affects	in	Alice	Munro,	we	
conceive	of	our	volume	as	a	response	to	Morgenstern’s	“The	Baby	or	The	Violin”—the	2003	
essay	that	issued	a	call	for	the	extensive	study	of	ethics	in	Munro’s	fiction--and	we	close	with	
her	critical	return	to	Munrovian	ethics	as	gendered,	relational	and	posthumous	in	
Morgenstern’s	“Life	after	Life:	Survival	in	the	(Late)	Fiction	of	Alice	Munro.”	Within	this	
recursive	frame,	the	scholars	who	have	contributed	to	this	volume	have	plentifully	and	
creatively	answered	Morgenstern’s—and	our—invitation	to	ponder	the	“exquisite	shame”	of	
Alice	Munro’s	ethics	and	to	inhabit	uncertainty	together.	Munro’s	fiction	reminds	us	of	the	
consequences	of	everyday	affects,	the	extraordinary	ordinariness	of	the	ethical	encounters	we	
engage	again	and	again.	In	her	exploration	of	the	minutiae	of	the	everyday,	anthropologist	
Kathleen	Stewart	explains	how	“The	ordinary	throws	itself	together	out	of	forms,	flows,	
powers,	pleasures,	encounters,	distractions,	drudgery,	denials,	practical	solutions,	shape-
shifting	forms	of	violence,	daydreams,	and	opportunities	lost	or	found.	Or	it	falters,	fails.	But	
either	way	we	feel	it.”
25
	Stewart’s	evocative	description	reads	like	an	encapsulation	of	Munro’s	
corpus,	which	delves	into	the	affects	and	effects	of	what	is	often	dismissively	termed	the	
“ordinary.”	Like	Stewart	and	other	theorists	of	affect,	Munro’s	stories	remind	us,	again	and	
again,	why	and	how	“ailments	and	emotions”	do	not	intrude	into	our	lives,	but	rather	
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constitute	those	lives,	betraying	the	redundancy	of	phrases,	like	“emotional	life,”	that	imply	the	
divisibility	of	the	two,	the	possibility	of	some	kind	of	non-emotional	existence.	Life,	survival,	is	
always,	already,	emotional,	embodied,	vulnerable,	relational,	in	short,	an	exquisite	tangle	of	
affects	and	ethics.	
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